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INTRODUCTION
In August 2007, Russia grabbed the world’s attention by sending a
pair of manned submersibles deep below the polar ice cap to plant a
Russian flag on the seabed floor at the North Pole.1 The stunt was an
impressive and daring technical achievement, but carried no legal
significance.2 It neither bolstered nor confirmed a Russian claim to
* Co-Chair, Law of the Sea Committee, ABA Section of International Law;
Associate, Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP; J.D., Yale Law School, B.A.,
Amherst College.
1. C.J. Chivers, Eyeing Future Wealth, Russians Plant the Flag on the Arctic
Seabed, Below the Polar Cap, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007, at A8.
2. This view is widely-shared. See, e.g., Oran R. Young, Whither the Arctic?
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the Arctic seabed. Nor did it constitute a deviation from the rule of
law. Rather, it signaled Russia’s intention and ability to continue
pressing a legal claim to a significant portion of the continental shelf
beneath the Arctic Ocean.
Nonetheless, Russia’s gambit accelerated a media obsession with
the Arctic. In the more than two years since Russia’s North Pole
adventure—and against a backdrop of a retreating polar ice cap and
rising temperatures3—journalists and scholars have come to describe
the Arctic’s future in alarmist terms. These reports include warnings
of “a race for control of the Arctic,”4 and a “coming anarchy” in
which states will “unilaterally grab” as much territory as possible to
secure new sources of oil and natural gas.5 Some describe the Arctic
as the site of “an armed mad dash” and a potential source of a future
armed conflict, likely involving the United States and Russia.6 This
troubling picture has generated calls for a new international
agreement—an “Arctic Treaty”—to provide a comprehensive legal

Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North, 45 POLAR REC. 73, 74-75
(2009); John B. Bellinger, Treaty On Ice, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2008, at A21; The
Arctic: Drawing Lines in Melting Ice, ECONOMIST, Aug. 18, 2007, at 49, 50.
3. See James Kraska, The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest
Passage, 22 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 257, 257-59 (2007) (remarking that
during the summer, the amount of sea ice had “declined more dramatically” than
usual); see also Andrew C. Revkin, Arctic Melt Unnerves the Experts, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 2007, at F1 (noting that, because the sea ice had dwindled so much, “two
long-imagined” shipping routes over the Arctic were accessible for a short while).
4. Colin Woodward, Who Resolves Arctic Oil Disputes?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Aug. 20, 2007 at 1.
5. Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown; The Economic and Security
Implications of Global Warming, FOREIGN AFF., March/April 2008, at 63
[hereinafter Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown]; see also Thomas Omestad, The Race for
the Arctic, as the Ice Melts, Nations Eye Oil and Gas Deposits and Shipping
Routes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 13, 2008, at 53 (characterizing the Aortic
as a “toxic brew” due to its prime location, potential source of natural resources,
and lack of clear ownership).
6. See Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown, supra note 5 (describing the possibility of
“armed brinkmanship” in response to disputed claims); see also Tony Halpin,
Russia Warns of War Within a Decade Over Arctic Oil and Gas, TIMES (LONDON),
May 14, 2009, at 34. Some Russian commentators have appeared willing—if not
downright eager—to use the Arctic as a foil for nationalist rhetoric. See Keir Giles,
Looking North, in MARK A. SMITH & KEIR GILES, RUSSIA AND THE ARCTIC: THE
“LAST DASH NORTH” 10, 14-15 (Def. Acad. of the U.K., Russian Ser. 07/26, Sept.
2007).
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regime for the region.7 In light of the above, it is easy to see why the
casual observer would be left thinking that when it comes to the
Arctic, we are operating in a legal vacuum.
But that is simply not the case. Indisputably, the Arctic poses
many challenges, but it is not a twenty-first century incarnation of
the Wild West. There are institutions and legal frameworks in place
through which the challenges of Arctic governance and management
can and should be addressed. As discussed below, the centerpiece of
that framework is the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (“UNCLOS” or “Convention”).8 Moreover, within the
existing governance structure, Russia’s track record with respect to
the Arctic—perhaps in contrast to Russia’s recent record
elsewhere—has arguably been more positive than not. As such,
rather than fixating on the Arctic as a flashpoint for confrontation, it
may be more useful to consider the Arctic as an opportunity for
constructive engagement.

I. DEVELOPING THE “RULE OF LAW” IN THE
ARCTIC DEMANDS STRENGTHENING THE
EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK, NOT A NEW
“ARCTIC TREATY”
There should be no serious debate that the Arctic climate is
undergoing dramatic change. The U.S. Geological Survey (“USGS”)
reports that “in the past 30 years, average temperatures in the Arctic
have increased at almost twice the rate of the planet as a whole.”9
7. See Donald R. Rothwell, The Arctic in International Affairs: Time for a
New Regime?, AUSTL. NAT’L. UNIV. COLL. OF LAW, Res. Paper No. 08-37,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1314546; Scott Borgerson, Op-Ed., An IceCold War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, at A19 [hereinafter Borgerson, An Ice-Cold
War]; see also ROBERT HUEBERT & BROOKS B. YEAGER, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND
[WWF], A NEW SEA: THE NEED FOR A REGIONAL AGREEMENT ON MANAGEMENT
AND CONSERVATION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT 24 (2008)
(emphasizing the need for a “an ecosystem approach to management of the Arctic,
rather than a merely sectoral or problem-based response”).
8. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
9. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY [USGS], U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROJECT,
PAST CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC AND AT HIGH LATITUDES
11 (2009), available at http://downloads.climatescience.gov/sap/sap1-2/sap1-2final-report-all.pdf.
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This has resulted in the “substantial retreat and thinning of the Arctic
sea ice cover.”10 Moreover, the retreat is “accelerating, and it is
expected to continue. The Arctic Ocean may become seasonally ice
free as early as 2040.”11 Others predict “an ice-free summer period”
by 2020,12 or even, extraordinarily, by 2013.13
These developments pose significant challenges on a global level,
particularly as melting ice introduces massive quantities of
freshwater into the oceans and threatens higher sea levels. But most
discussion of the Arctic focuses on the regional challenges at hand.
The shrinking polar ice cap sets the stage for increased human
activity in the region, notably through the development of oil and
natural gas deposits, the prospect of seasonal or year-round
commercial shipping, and the exploitation of newly accessible
fisheries. Each of these developments poses legal and political
challenges.
But do these challenges demand Arctic-specific solutions in the
form of a comprehensive, non-sectoral “Arctic Treaty?” On this
point, the United States and Russia agree: such a treaty is neither
necessary nor desirable. In May 2008, representatives of the five
Arctic coastal states (Canada, Denmark (through Greenland),
Norway, Russia, and the United States) met in Ilulissat, Greenland to
underscore that shared understanding:
The Arctic Ocean stands at the threshold of significant
changes. Climate change and the melting of ice have a
potential impact on vulnerable ecosystems, the livelihoods of
local inhabitants and indigenous communities, and the
potential exploitation of natural resources.

10. Id. at 418.
11. See id. (explaining also that as the sea ice diminishes each year, the Arctic
will get warmer due to a “feedback mechanism between ice and its reflectivity”).
12. See Rosemary Rayfuse, Warm Waters and Cold Shoulders: Jostling for
Jurisdiction in Polar Oceans 4, (Univ. of New S. Wales Faculty of Law Res.
Series, Working Paper No. 56, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1402390# (remarking that the estimates for an ice-free
summer “are constantly being revised downward”).
13. Scott Borgerson & Caitlyn Antrim, Op-Ed., An Arctic Circle of Friends,
N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 2009, at A21 (speculating that ice-free summers will lead
to increases in shipping, fishing, and tourism in the Arctic).
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. . . Notably, the law of the sea provides for important rights
and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits
of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine
environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of
navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the
sea. We remain committed to this legal framework and to the
orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims.
This framework provides a solid foundation for responsible
management by the five coastal States and other users of this
Ocean through national implementation and application of
relevant provisions. We therefore see no need to develop a
new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the
Arctic Ocean.14
The Ilulissat Declaration clearly rejects the proposal for “a new
comprehensive legal regime” for the Arctic. But this is not a blow to
the rule of law (as some suggest). On the contrary, it focuses
attention on the political and legal mechanisms already in place that
should be enhanced and applied to Arctic issues. A closer look at
some of the key components of the existing governance structure
may help explain why the Arctic states have taken this position,
despite the very real change taking place.

A. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
(“UNCLOS”)
UNCLOS is the cornerstone of the existing legal framework for
the Arctic. Sometimes described as a “constitution for the oceans,”
UNCLOS is “the product of centuries of practice, three U.N.
Conferences (1958, 1960, and 1973-1982), and a subsequent
agreement on implementation, negotiated from 1990 to 1994.”15 It is
widely considered “one of the most comprehensive and wellestablished bodies of international law in existence [and] . . . is
critical to creating a more secure international environment.”16
14. The Ilulissat Declaration, U.S.-Can.-Den.-Nor.-Russ., Arctic Ocean Conf.,
Ilulissat, Greenland, May 29, 2008, available at http://arctic-council.org/file
archive/Ilulissat-declaration.pdf.
15. SCOTT G. BORGERSON, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., THE NATIONAL
INTEREST AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 6 (2009).
16. See Devon Chaffee, Freedom or Force on the High Seas?: Arms
Interdiction and International Law, SCI. DEMOCRATIC ACTION, June 2004, at 1, 2.
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UNCLOS is wide-ranging in scope and attempts to strike a careful
balance between the “exclusive” right of coastal States to control
their marine resources and an “inclusive” freedom of the seas to
which all states are entitled.17 On the one hand, UNCLOS codifies a
12 nautical mile (“nm”) territorial sea,18 a contiguous zone extending
24 nm from the coastline,19 and an Exclusive Economic Zone
(“EEZ”) extending 200 nm from the coastline20—maritime zones in
which the coastal State wields substantial regulatory authority (and
complete sovereignty with respect to the territorial sea). On the other
hand, UNCLOS carefully preserves the traditional freedoms (e.g.,
navigation and other uses) of the high seas21—those waters beyond
the EEZ—and codifies the concepts of “innocent passage” through
the territorial sea,22 and “transit passage” through international
straits.23 The Convention sets forth a framework for the development
of more specific measures aimed at the shared management of living
marine resources24 and the prevention and reduction of marine
pollution.25 It also provides a “menu” of options for the resolution of
oceans-related disputes.26 All of these provisions are relevant to the
Arctic.
In particular, Article 76 of UNCLOS creates a system under which
coastal states can acquire exclusive rights to the exploitation of
defined sections of the ocean floor. Specifically, Article 76 defines
the continental shelf, provides geological criteria relevant to
establishing its outer limits beyond 200 nm from the coastline (up to
the 350 nm limit), and creates an independent commission charged
with reviewing and endorsing those claims.27 This means that coastal
states have exclusive rights to explore and exploit the natural
17. Michael A. Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of
Navigation and the Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 131, 167-75
(2005) (remarking that changes in the ways in which states manage their resources
has somewhat “qualified” the freedoms traditionally enjoyed on the high seas).
18. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 3.
19. Id. art. 33.
20. Id. art. 57.
21. Id. art. 87.
22. Id. art. 17.
23. Id. art. 38.
24. Id. arts. 117-119.
25. Id. arts. 192-237.
26. Id. arts. 279-299.
27. Id. art. 76.
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resources (e.g., oil and natural gas) of their continental shelves up to
at least 200 nm from the coastline (corresponding to the limit of the
EEZ), but also allows states to claim an “extended continental shelf”
beyond the 200 nm limit if they can adduce sufficient scientific
evidence of the shelf’s continuation.28 A state must submit its
application, including the relevant scientific data, within ten years of
joining the Convention. It is largely this possibility—the right to
claim an extended continental shelf—that underlies the media frenzy
over the “scramble” to establish Arctic claims.
UNCLOS does not address the Arctic by name. It does, however,
include a provision on “Ice-Covered Areas.” Article 234 provides as
follows:
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce nondiscriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention,
reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in icecovered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic
zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the
presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year
create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and
pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm
to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such
laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and
the protection and preservation of the marine environment
based on the best available scientific evidence.29
At some point, Article 234 may no longer apply to the Arctic if
climate change results in a region that is no longer “ice-covered.”30
But until that time arrives—and probably for a significant time yet—
Article 234 provides the Arctic coastal States with significant leeway
to regulate the use of Arctic waters within their EEZs on a nondiscriminatory basis. That said, Article 234 does not provide any
basis for regulation of the high seas that lie beyond the EEZs of the

28. Id. art. 77; see also David A. Colson, The Delimitation of the Outer
Continental Shelf Between Neighboring States, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 91 (2003)
(extensively discussing the continental shelf provisions, including the difficulty of
reconciling legal and geological approaches to the concept).
29. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 234. As will be discussed, Canada and Russia
have availed themselves of this provision to regulate Arctic shipping lanes.
30. See Rayfuse, supra note 12 (hypothesizing that there will be debates about
the terms and phrases in Article 234, which could question its applicability).
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circumpolar states—waters which may become largely ice-free and
fully navigable.
There are currently 160 parties to UNCLOS, including four of the
five Arctic coastal states: Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Russia
(which joined in 1997).31 As of 2009, the United States had not yet
acceded to the Convention, despite extensive and bipartisan support
for it to do so.32 And while the United States bestows the status of
customary international law on most UNCLOS provisions,33 the
failure of the United States to accede to the treaty has deprived it of a
“seat at the table when the rights that are vital to [U.S.] interests are
debated and interpreted.”34 Non-party status precludes the United
States from submitting an application for the recognition of any
extended continental shelf it may be able to claim in the Arctic.
Indeed, to the extent the United States is concerned about the
adherence of Russia or any other country to the laws and norms that
31. See U.N. Div. for Ocean Aff. and the Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists
of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related
Agreements as at 06 November 2009, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/
chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#TheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawo
ftheSea (last visited Dec. 3, 2009).
32. See Michael A. Becker, International Law of the Sea, 43 INT’L LAW. 915,
915-16 (2009). For the last fifteen years, a small but vocal opposition—armed with
flawed arguments—has prevented UNCLOS from receiving a full vote by the
United States Senate. See David J. Bederman, The Old Isolationism and the New
Law of the Sea: Reflections on Advice and Consent for UNCLOS, 49 HARV. INT’L
L.J. ONLINE 21, 24 (2008), http://www.harvardilj.org/online/126 (pointing out that
opponents to UNCLOS rely on the weak argument that the provisions already exist
under customary international law ); William L. Schachte, Jr., The Unvarnished
Truth: The Debate on the Law of the Sea Convention, 61 NAVAL WAR C. R. 119
(2008) (discussing the various and unpersuasive arguments against ratification, and
also pointing out that the initial—and only—objections raised by the Reagan
Administration to certain UNCLOS provisions relating to deep-sea mining were
satisfactorily resolved by the subsequent Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 41).
33. See Statement on United States Oceans Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 378, 378–79
(Mar. 10, 1983) (recognizing the necessity of navigation and overflight provisions
and declaring a 200 mile EEZ).
34. Statement on Advancement of United States Maritime Interests, 43
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 635 (May 15, 2007); see also John B. Bellinger III,
U.S. Dept. of St., The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention 3 (Law of
the Sea Inst. Occasional Paper No. 5, 2008) (asserting that the United States “has
an enormous stake” in the UNCLOS provisions and would have benefited by
exerting “a level of influence commensurate with [its] interests”).
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apply to the Arctic, the United States would considerably strengthen
its position by swiftly acceding to the Convention.

B. ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARCTIC
Several other agreements and institutions supplement the
UNCLOS framework and have direct application to the Arctic. A
non-exhaustive list includes:
• The Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North East Atlantic;35
• The Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks (the “Fish Stocks Agreement”);36
• The International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol
of 1978;37
• The International Convention for the Safety of Life at

Sea;38
• The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal;39
and

35. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East
Atlantic, 32 I.L.M. 1072 (1992).
36. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 88 [hereinafter Fish Stocks Agreement].
37. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov.
2, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184; Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Feb. 17, 1978, 1340
U.N.T.S. 61.
38. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32
U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278.
39. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, March 22, 1989, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-5,
1673 U.N.T.S. 57.
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In addition, two institutions require mention here: the International
Maritime Organization (“IMO”) and the Arctic Council.
The IMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations. Its
mandate concerns the development and maintenance of a
comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping. This includes the
promulgation of rules and regulations relating to ship safety and the
effect of shipping on the maritime environment. While not focused
exclusively on the Arctic, the IMO develops rules and standards that
have both general and specific application to the region. In particular,
the IMO has developed guidelines for ships operating in ice-covered
waters (the so-called “Polar Code”).41 These guidelines—which are
currently only recommendatory—apply to the construction,
equipment, and operation of vessels navigating in the Arctic.42
The Arctic Council was established in 1996 as a high level
intergovernmental forum for coordination among the Arctic states
and indigenous Arctic populations. Its focus has historically been
sustainable development and environmental protection. It is a “soft
law” body that serves an advisory function, but the organization—
which includes the United States and Russia as active participants—
has successfully raised the profile of Arctic issues and facilitated a
science-based, depoliticized approach to developing environmental
policy for the region.43 For example, it has issued extensive

40. United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], Stockholm Convention
on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 532.
41. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic IceCovered Waters, MSC/Circ.1056 (Dec. 23, 2002), available at http://www.imo.org
/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D6629/1056-MEPC-Circ399.pdf.
42. See ØYSTEIN JENSEN, FRIDTJOF NANSENS INST. [FNI], THE IMO
GUIDELINES FOR SHIPS OPERATING IN ICE-COVERED WATERS: FROM VOLUNTARY
TO MANDATORY TOOL FOR NAVIGATION SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION?, at v (2007), available at http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/FNI-R0207.pdf
(noting that the guidelines are designed to address the risks associated with
navigating the Arctic’s international shipping routes).
43. See Young, supra note 2, at 79 (recognizing that including non-state actors
in discussions about policy is key to the Council’s achievements).
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guidelines on offshore oil and gas activities.44 It has also provided
recommendations to improve the safety of shipping in the region.45
Indeed, the Arctic Council occupies a critical role in developing
policy and best practices for the region; this contribution should not
be undervalued.46 Whether or not a comprehensive treaty for the
Arctic is desirable, it would undoubtedly face enormous—even
insurmountable—political obstacles. As such, the Arctic Council
holds greater potential to play an increasingly important role in
efforts to improve Arctic governance by promoting the
harmonization of national laws and regulations, a strategy that may
be more effective than the promotion of comprehensive “top-down”
solutions by treaty. At the same time, the Arctic Council can seek to
ensure that international institutions in a position to effect
widespread reforms—such as the IMO—are “well informed about
conditions prevailing in the Arctic.”47
In sum, UNCLOS and a wide range of complementary
international agreements and organizations provide a legal
framework for the issues we face—or soon will face—in the Arctic.
That is not to say the existing framework provides clear or robust
rules for every situation. Nor can it guarantee that any state—Russia,
the United States, or any other—will always conduct itself in a
manner that lives up to international standards. But the framework
provides an adequate starting point, and it should also remind us that
“new” challenges facing the Arctic are not necessarily unique or
unfamiliar. Many of these issues—from drawing maritime borders to
promoting safe navigation to protecting the marine environment—

44. ARCTIC COUNCIL, PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENV’T WORKING
GROUP, ARCTIC OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS GUIDELINES (2009), available at
http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/ArcticOffhsoreOilandGasGuidelines2009.pdf.
45. These recommendations provide the substance of a bill that was introduced
in the U.S. Senate in August 2009—the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment
Implementation Act of 2009, S. 1514, 111th Cong. (2009). See Sen. Lisa
Murkowski, Op-Ed., Arctic Holds Both Promise and Challenges,
JUNEAUEMPIRE.COM, Aug. 20, 2009, http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/
082009/opi_483649495.shtml (remarking that the Act was intended to enable the
United States to tackle the challenges presented by the Arctic).
46. See Young, supra note 2, at 79 (acknowledging that the Council has
elevated Arctic concerns to a global level, with particular emphasis on pollution).
47. Id. at 81.
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are quintessential law of the sea issues to which international
policymakers bring a wealth of experience.

II. APPLYING THE EXISTING LEGAL
FRAMEWORK TO THE CHALLENGES FACING
THE ARCTIC
As noted above, three of the principal ways in which melting ice
will give way to increased human activity in the Arctic are through
oil and natural gas recovery, commercial shipping, and fishing. This
section will briefly discuss the application of the existing legal
framework to those challenges.

A. HYDROCARBON EXPLOITATION
In an energy-driven world, the prospect of extensive and
undiscovered hydrocarbon deposits has fueled the current focus on
the Arctic. USGS scientists estimate that the Arctic contains
conventional oil and gas resources totaling approximately 90 billion
barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion
barrels of natural gas liquids.48 This could amount to “just over a fifth
of the world’s undiscovered, recoverable oil and natural-gas
resources.”49 These numbers highlight the importance of the
UNCLOS provisions that govern the exploitation of resources in the
continental shelf and beyond. By reaching agreements with
neighboring states as to the delimitation of its continental shelf
within the 200 nm limit50—and by “certifying” claims to the
extended continental shelf beyond that limit with the Commission on
Limits of the Continental Shelf (“Commission”)—each Arctic
coastal state can secure legal certainty over the scope of its

48. USGS, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil
and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, USGS Fact Sheet 2008-3049 (2008), available
at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/.
49. Stephen Power, Bush Moves to Update U.S. Policy in Arctic Region, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 8, 2009.
50. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 83 (“The delimitation of the continental
shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by
agreement on the basis of international law . . . in order to achieve an equitable
solution.”).
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jurisdiction. This is a prerequisite to resource recovery projects that
require massive amounts of public and private investment.51
In accordance with the procedures set forth in Article 76 of
UNCLOS, Russia and Norway have already submitted extended
shelf claims to the Commission.52 In 2001, Russia made the first such
application, which included a claim to the Lomonosov Ridge, a
1,240-mile undersea mountain chain extending from the Russian
coast to the North Pole and beyond.53 The claim sought to add nearly
one million square kilometers to Russia’s arctic territory.54 Other
states, including the United States, objected to that application on the
merits.55 A year later, the Commission recommended that Russia
make a revised submission based on additional scientific evidence.56
Significantly, Russia accepted the Commission’s ruling and is in the
process of developing a stronger submission through the collection
and analysis of additional evidence from the ocean floor. Elsewhere,
submissions from Denmark and Canada are expected in the coming
years. The United States—which, like its Arctic neighbors, is busily
mapping the ocean floor to compile the necessary data for its own
51. See Richard R. Burgess, The New Cold War? Melting of Ice Spurs
Maritime Activity as Nations Rush to Stake Claims for Potential Arctic Resources,
SEAPOWER, Oct. 2007, at 14 (observing that oil companies need “security of
tenure” before financing and insuring continental shelf investments).
52. Comm'n on the Limits of the Cont'l Shelf (CLCS), Outer Limits of the
Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submission by
the Russian Federation, Ref. No. CLCS 01.2001.LOS (Dec. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm;
Comm'n on the Limits of the Cont'l Shelf (CLCS), Outer Limits of the Continental
Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submission by the Kingdom
of Norway, Ref. No. CLCS.07.2006.LOS (Nov. 26, 2006), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nor.htm.
53. Id. at 15.
54. David Malakoff, Nations Look For an Edge in Claiming Continental
Shelves, 298 SCIENCE 1877 (2002).
55. See United States of America: Notification Regarding the Submission Made
by the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf, U.N. Ref. CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA (Mar. 18, 2002) (including a letter from
Ambassador John D. Negroponte to U.N. Under-Secretary General for Legal
Affairs Hans Corell, in which the Ambassador raised questions about the
differences between Russia’s scientific data and other data in the scientific
community).
56. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Oceans
and the Law of the Sea, ¶ 41, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/57/57/Add.1 (Oct. 8, 2002)
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claim—cannot submit an application to the Commission until it
accedes to UNCLOS.57
For purposes of this assessment, however, the crucial point is that
mechanisms exist for the peaceful establishment of these claims
through the submission of scientific evidence to the Commission.58
And the Arctic states, including Russia, have been following the
rules of the game, and, in some instances, working together to
develop the necessary scientific data.59 It is important to keep in
mind that while these claims may implicate very large tracts of
territory (as Russia’s initial application certainly did), there is
nothing inherently illegitimate about such claims; the extent of “the
submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State” and
“the slope and the rise” of “the sea-bed and subsoil of the shelf” does
not command a pari passu distribution of continental shelf among
the Arctic states.60 In brief, some states’ shelves may simply be
bigger than others. This outcome could be entirely consistent with
the rule of law.
While there are legitimate reasons to be concerned that the
Commission is overworked and understaffed, there is currently no
indication that any country, Russia included, is prepared to charge
ahead with an Arctic claim that has not received the Commission’s

57. See The Scramble for the Seabed: Suddenly, a Wider World Below the
Waterline, ECONOMIST, May 14, 2009, at 35 (noting that any country that ratified
the treaty prior to May 1999 has ten years from the date of ratification to submit a
claim for extension of their continental shelf beyond the normal 200 nm
extension).
58. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 279 (“States Parties shall settle any
dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of this
Convention by peaceful means.”); but see, e.g., Rayfuse, supra note 12, at 6
(arguing that there are legitimate concerns that the existing legal framework may
lack sufficient provisions “for coordinating activities occurring between the high
seas water column and the extended continental shelf”).
59. See Bellinger, supra note 2 (observing that Russia has complied with
international law as it maps its extended continental shelf); see also MINISTER OF
INDIAN AFF. & N. DEV., GOV’T OF CAN., CANADA’S NORTHERN STRATEGY: OUR
NORTH, OUR HERITAGE, OUR FUTURE 12 (2009), available at http://www.northern
strategy.ca/cns/cns.pdf, at 12 [hereinafter CANADA’S NORTHERN STRATEGY]
(describing the process as “not a race,” but rather a “collaborative process based on
a shared commitment to international law” in which Canada, Denmark, Russia, and
the United States are working together).
60. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 76(3).
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approval.61 Consistent with that view, it has emerged that February
2009 talks between Canada and Russia included discussion of a
potential joint submission from Canada, Denmark, and Russia to the
Commission.62 Such an application would not determine competing
claims among the three countries, but would allow for demarcation
of the area under the control of those coastal states from the area
beyond. Furthermore, the collaboration required to produce a joint
submission could itself be a valuable confidence-building measure
that would defuse nascent disagreements over exactly where final
borders should be drawn.
Indeed, there is a premium on cooperation among the circumpolar
states when it comes to hydrocarbons. Without efforts to reach
negotiated settlements, it may be very difficult to secure the
investment that resource recovery in the region will require.63 And
the international approbation that would accompany an act of
unilateral annexation of the Arctic continental shelf would likely not
be worth the prize. A large percentage of the hydrocarbon deposits in
the Arctic—and those which are probably most feasible to
capture64—are located within the 200 nm of continental shelf over
which, for the most part, the littoral states already exercise
jurisdiction and effective control.65
61. It bears mention that even if a state sought to assert unilateral control, doing
so would likely be easier said than done in the difficult Arctic conditions. And
while Russia has a significant advantage over the United States in terms of Arctic
infrastructure (most notably, a much larger fleet of icebreakers), the assertion of
control through military force is difficult to imagine at this juncture. See generally
Oleg Bukharin, Russia’s Nuclear Icebreaker Fleet, 14 SCI. & GLOBAL SECURITY
25 (2006) (discussing the power of the Russian icebreaker fleet, and noting
Russia’s plans for expansion of the icebreaker program).
62. Randy Boswell, Thaw May Be Underway in Ottawa-Moscow Arctic Issues,
CANWEST NEWS SERV., May 12, 2009, http://www.canada.com/technology/Thaw+
underway+Ottawa+Moscow+Arctic+issues/1589395/story.html (last visited Dec.
4, 2009).
63. See Burgess, supra note 51, at 14 (“Determining the sovereignty of a
section of continental shelf bears directly on the economics of resource
exploration.”)
64. See McKenzie Funk, Arctic Landgrab, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, May 2009, at
2 (detailing the high expenses and danger associated with the initial journey of the
Mir I and Mir II, two privately-funded Russian submersibles initially sent to the
bottom of the North Pole).
65. See Borgerson & Antrim, supra note 13, at A21 (remarking that any oil or
mineral fields found at the lower depths outside of countries’ EEZs would be
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B. COMMERCIAL SHIPPING
The prospect of seasonal or even year-round commercial shipping
in the Arctic poses a different challenge. Some fear that if, or when,
Arctic shipping routes become commercially feasible, significant
environmental degradation will inevitably follow. Indeed, the
Arctic’s marine environment may be especially susceptible to the
pollution caused by regular vessel traffic. The economist Robert
Wade has set the risks against the potential gains in the following
terms:
Shipping poses dangers to the ecosystem of the Arctic, which
is even more vulnerable than more southerly environments.
The biggest danger is from accidents, because oil and other
organic substances decompose more slowly in cold water and
ice, and ice can interfere with clean-up. Also, emissions from
fossil-fuelled vessels may cause greying of the ice cap,
accelerating melting. On the other hand, shorter shipping
routes could significantly cut fuel consumption and
greenhouse gas emissions, especially if engines use hydrogen
or nuclear fuel . . . .66
Historically, there have been two potential sea routes connecting
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through the Arctic: the Northwest
Passage, a series of straits and channels “through the northern tier of
the North American continent,”67 and the Northern Sea Route along
Russia’s northern coast. Compared to routes through the Panama
Canal or the Suez, these routes reduce the journeys between New
York and Tokyo or between Shanghai and Rotterdam by thousands
of miles.68

prohibitively expensive to extract).
66. Robert Wade, A Warmer Arctic Ocean Needs Shipp Rules, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
15, 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1c415b68-c374-11dc-b0830000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1.
67. Kraska, supra note 3, at 258.
68. Id.; see also Wade, supra note 66 (highlighting distance and security as two
benefits to opening the northern shipping route); Erik Kirschbaum, Climate
Change Opens Arctic Route for German Ships, REUTERS, Aug. 21, 2009, available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-BusinessofGreen/idUSTRE57K53Z20090
821 (commenting on the savings in fuel costs and emissions that would result from
using the Northern Route).
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Russia has made limited use of the Northern Sea Route over the
past century, in large part to support remote Siberian outposts—and
only to the extent that ice-breakers made such transit possible. But an
Arctic shipping infrastructure exists, and the Soviet Union “gradually
developed the entire Northern Sea Route as an internal waterway, in
support of the industrial development of Arctic resources.”69
However, in the post-Soviet era, the route’s commercial use has
remained highly limited; there is still significant ice blockage during
much of the year and Russia, until 2009, had not approved transit
through the Northern Sea Route by any non-Russian commercial
vessel. Significantly, in August 2009, two German-owned ships,
Beluga Fraternity and Beluga Foresight, undertook and completed
the voyage, with Russian approval and without ice-breaker
assistance.70
This suggests an important evolution in the development of
Russian law and regulation pertaining to commercial use of the sea
route, but it is unknown at the time of writing whether or how Russia
applied its traditional transit requirements to the Beluga vessels.
Under the auspices of Article 234 of UNCLOS, Russia has
traditionally required its own commercial vessels to pay a tariff and
accept government escorts and ice-breaker assistance on the ground
that the continuous presence of ice creates a safety hazard to
vessels.71 As a result, the operational, political, and commercial risks
of regular transit through the Northern Sea Route have prevented the
international shipping industry from seizing the long-awaited
opportunity to exploit an Arctic “short-cut” between East and West.
Accordingly, the voyage undertaken by the Beluga vessels marks an
important transition.
By comparison, the Northwest Passage has historically been nonnavigable (with a few limited exceptions).72 It is not yet subject to

69. Claes Lykke Ragner, ‘Den Norra Sjövägen’ [The Northern Sea Route] in
BARENTS – ETT GRÄNSLAND I NORDEN (Torsten Hallberg ed., 2008).
70. Kirschbaum, supra note 68; German Ships Successfully Make “Arctic
Passage,” REUTERS, Sept. 12, 2009.
71. Ragner, supra note 69 (noting that Russia regulations require ships crossing
through its EEZ to notify the Russian authorities of the voyage, apply for an icebreaker to guide them along the route, and also pay an “ice-breaker fee”).
72. See Kraska, supra note 67, at 263-66 (stating that in 1969 an American
vessel—accompanied by U.S. Coast Guard ice-breakers and without Canada’s
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regular transit by commercial shipping vessels, but that situation
appears to be changing. The passage was identified as “ice free” for
the first time in 2007.73 It became ice-free again in 2008 and saw its
first recorded commercial voyage.74 But the Northwest Passage lies
at the center of a long simmering legal dispute between Canada on
one side, and the United States and the European Union on the other.
Canada contends that the Northwest Passage constitutes “internal
waters” and is fully subject to Canadian sovereignty. The United
States and the European Union deem the waterway an “international
strait” subject to the regime of “transit passage” established by
UNCLOS.75 Whether under a theory of “internal waters” or pursuant
to Article 234 of UNCLOS, Canada imposes stringent environmental
standards on ships crossing Arctic waters within its EEZ and is
seeking to require those ships to report to Canadian authorities.76
In the abstract, Russian and Canadian efforts to impose tighter
restrictions on vessel traffic through these waterways seem sensible;
there are unique navigational dangers to traversing ice-covered
waters. The underlying question is whether these measures are
motivated predominantly by concern for the safety of seafarers and
the polar environment, or instead are a pretext for nationalistic
posturing and geopolitical brinksmanship. Under either scenario, are
these measures at some level contrary to the rule of law? Some
permission—passed through the Northwest Passage, sparking the modern
disagreement over the passage’s legal status).
73. John Roach, Arctic Melt Opens Northwest Passage, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
NEWS, Sept. 17, 2007, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/pf/38614724.html
(last visited Dec. 4, 2009).
74. 1st Commercial Ship Sails Through Northwest Passage, CBCNEWS.COM,
Nov. 28, 2008, www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2008/11/28/nwest-vessel.html (last
visited Dec. 4, 2009) (explaining that the passage opened much sooner than
scientists had predicted).
75. See generally Kraska, supra note 3, at 275 (arguing that UNCLOS does not
support Canada’s “excessive” claims to the passage).
76. Canadian regulation over its Arctic waters long predates Canada’s 2003
accession to UNCLOS. The seminal statute is the Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act of 1971, which has since been amended to enhance and strengthen
Canada’s regulatory presence. The Canada Shipping Act of 2001 now requires
vessels transiting Arctic waters to report to the Canadian Coast Guard. See
CANADA’S NORTHERN STRATEGY, supra note 59, at 11-12; Canada Requires Ship
Registration in Arctic, MSNBC.COM, Aug. 27, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/26429116/ns/world_news-americas/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2009) (stating that
previously registration with Canadian authorities had been voluntary).
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exercise of non-discriminatory, science-based regulation pursuant to
Article 234 is consistent with the UNCLOS framework, but claims to
national sovereignty over the waterways—i.e., declarations that such
waterways constitute historic “internal waterways”—are excessive. It
would be interesting to see how Russian and Canadian authorities
will react if current regulations are challenged. Would national or
international courts deem those regulations consistent with either
country’s international obligations under UNCLOS?
That said, disagreements stemming from access to and utilization
of the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route are disputes
that are more appropriate for negotiation than litigation;77 neither
disagreement is likely to result in a serious escalation.78 And if the
ultimate interest is safe and clean commercial shipping for the
benefit of all states, Arctic and non-Arctic alike, tough but
reasonable standards will serve the community interest. As Professor
James Kraska of the Naval War College has forcefully argued with
respect to the Northwest Passage, “[t]he outcome of the debate may
not be as critical as some would believe, since acceptance of the
passage as an international strait would permit Canada to seek
development of internationally accepted standards for protecting the
strait at the [IMO].”79 Similar arguments can be made with respect to
the Northern Sea Route, although the waterway, strictly speaking, is
not an international strait. The key factor is that the IMO is already

77. See, e.g., CANADA’S NORTHERN STRATEGY, supra note 59, at 13
(describing the U.S.-Canada dispute over the Northwest Passage as “wellmanaged,” posing “no sovereignty or defense challenges for Canada,” and,
furthermore, having “no impact on Canada’s ability to work collaboratively and
cooperatively” with its Arctic neighbors).
78. However, the prospect of Canada and Russia backing each other’s
positions—aligned against the United States and the European Union on this
issue—may complicate the discussions. But it is unlikely that the United States
would accept the argument that acquiescence to Russian and Canadian
jurisdictional assertions over the waterways benefits the international community
at large. See Kraska, supra note 67, at 279.
This view undervalues concerns among other maritime powers over the
negative precedent for worldwide freedom of the seas arising from unilateral
assertions of excessive claims. For the United States in particular, maintaining
a stable regime that ensures global maritime maneuverability and mobility is
considered a cornerstone of the nation’s economic and national security.
Id.
79. See id. at 260.

AUTHOR CHECK 1 (DO NOT DELETE)

244

2/15/2010 2:35 PM

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[25:225

addressing these issues (recall the development of the “Polar Code”)
and is the best positioned international body to push for existing
guidelines to become standard industry practice.80 Indeed, Russia
was scheduled to participate in the IMO’s “voluntary audit scheme”
in the fall of 2009, which gave the IMO an opportunity to provide a
comprehensive assessment of the state of Russia’s compliance with
international standards.81 Russian participation in the audit is itself a
positive sign that, at least with respect to commercial shipping,
Russia is developing its Arctic policies under the auspices of the
existing governance structure.
More generally, the prospect of a completely ice-free Arctic Ocean
contemplates heretofore unimaginable shipping routes, straight over
the North Pole itself and substantially through “international waters”
(although such a route would still require vessels to pass through the
EEZs of one or more coastal states to reach the Arctic high seas).
That possibility means that coastal state regulation alone cannot
address the challenge of Arctic shipping. It also demands asking
whether an ice-free Arctic Ocean should even be conceptualized as a
unique regime, separate and apart from the high seas regime that
applies everywhere else. Does the fact that an ice-free Arctic Ocean
constitutes a “new space” for human movement require a new legal
approach? The more that climate change renders the Arctic Ocean an
ice-free zone separating the North American and Eurasian continents
and exposes weaknesses in the current high seas regime, the more we
should question why the focus is not on efforts to reform and
improve the high seas regime generally, without special reference to
the Arctic, and for the benefit of the oceans system on a global basis.

C. FISHERIES
Finally, climate change appears likely to soon make commercial
fishing activity possible “within areas of the Arctic Ocean previously

80. See Young, supra note 2, at 75 (arguing that the guidelines need a
significant amount of work to form the foundation of an “effective regulatory
regime” for a potential increase in commercial shipping, but noting also that “this
is the sort of challenge that . . . the IMO [is] relatively well prepared to handle”).
81. Russia is Ready to Participate in Voluntary IMO Member State AuditTransport Ministry, RZD-PARTNER, July 13, 2009, http://www.rzdpartner.com/news/2009/07/13/342858.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2009).
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protected from fishing by ice cover.”82 Fishing stocks are heading
north as water temperatures increase.83 Illegal, unreported, and
unregulated fishing is a worldwide problem, and the Arctic is no
exception.84
The key international legal instrument for fisheries management is
the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement,85 an outgrowth of UNCLOS. The
Fish Stocks Agreement facilitates coordination between coastal
states and states with fishing vessels on the high seas to set and
enforce catch limits with respect to “straddling stocks” or “highly
migratory fish,” that is, fish populations that live in, or migrate
between, more than one EEZ. Management is delegated to subsidiary
bodies—Regional
Fisheries
Management
Organizations
(“RFMOs”)—that handle the actual work of monitoring the catch,
adjusting limits, and enforcing the rules.86
Fisheries management is contentious everywhere, and there is no
reason to expect that it will not be in the Arctic as well. Already, the
Arctic periphery is subject to the North East Atlantic Fisheries
Commission (in which Russia participates) in the case of Arctic cod
and spring spawning herring in the Norwegian Sea and the
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock
Resources in the Central Bering Sea (to which both Russia and the
United States are signatories).87 If these regimes can be expanded to
address the opening of new fisheries in the Arctic, the member states
should endeavor to do so.

82. HUEBERT & YEAGER, supra note 7, at 8 (identifying the potential increase
in fishing activity as “[p]ossibly the greatest short- to medium-term threat to
marine biodiversity”).
83. Id. at 9.
84. BURNETT ET AL., WWF, ILLEGAL FISHING IN ARCTIC WATERS: CATCH OF
TODAY - GONE TOMORROW? 1 (Apr. 2008) (estimating worldwide economic losses
associated with illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing at $15 billion per year).
85. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, Dec. 4, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542.
86. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 36.
87. Young, supra note 2, at 75; see also BURNETT ET AL., supra note 84, at 910 (noting that Norway and Russia also participate in a Joint Norwegian-Russian
Fisheries Commission that manages the cod stock habitat straddling the two
countries’ EEZs).

AUTHOR CHECK 1 (DO NOT DELETE)

246

2/15/2010 2:35 PM

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[25:225

Another possibility is the creation of an RFMO for the Arctic.
More narrowly tailored than a comprehensive, ecosystem-based
treaty for the region (which would cover everything from fisheries
and dumping, to polar bears and the rights of indigenous peoples),
this is the kind of regional cooperation that is both sensible and
politically feasible.88 Such an approach finds considerable precedent
in the numerous RFMOs already up and running (with, admittedly,
varied degrees of success). Because the individual EEZs of the
Arctic coastal states do not provide complete coverage over the
Arctic Ocean, the area of high seas beyond the EEZs will be
susceptible to overfishing that will threaten stocks throughout the
region. History has shown that fishing fleets act quickly to exploit
such loopholes in the regulatory regime. Take, for example, the case
of the so-called “donut hole” in the Central Bering Sea—an area of
high seas completely surrounded by the EEZs of Russia and the
United States.89 The failure of neighboring states to jointly manage
the area led to rampant overfishing during the 1980s and the total
collapse of stocks by 1992.90 Since then, the United States and Russia
have jointly observed and enforced a moratorium on fishing in the
area.91 Similar problems have plagued the so-called “loop hole” in
the Barents Sea.

88. To this end, former President George W. Bush signed a joint resolution of
the U.S. Congress that directs the United States to work with other nations on
agreements for managing migratory and transboundary fish stocks in the Arctic
Ocean. The resolution further requires the United States to support international
efforts “to halt the expansion of commercial fishing activities in the high seas of
the Arctic Ocean” until an appropriate RFMO can be established. See Pub. L. No.
110-243, 122 Stat. 1569, 1570-71 (2008). The United States took an additional step
towards this objective in August 2009 when the U.S. Department of Commerce
approved the Arctic Fishery Management Plan, which will effectively “prohibit the
expansion of commercial fishing in federal Arctic waters until researchers gather
sufficient information on fish and the Arctic marine environment to prevent
adverse impacts of commercial harvesting activity on the ecosystem.” See Press
Release, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA], Secretary of
Commerce Gary Locke Approves Fisheries Plan for Arctic (Aug. 20, 2009),
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2009/20090820_arctic.html (last visited
Dec. 4, 2009).
89. BURNETT ET AL., supra note 84, at 18.
90. Id. (specifying that three years earlier, various nations caught around 1.4
million tons of fish from the donut hole, and stating that the fishery has not
recovered from the resulting collapse).
91. Id.
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Without venturing into the intricacies of how an RFMO for the
Arctic Ocean might be established and operated, the point is that the
United States, Russia, and the other Arctic states are familiar with
the challenges of managing sustainable fisheries and the
consequences of failing to act proactively. Furthermore, all eight
Arctic states have ratified the Fish Stocks Agreement, a strong
indication “that all eight states have already accepted the principles
established by [UNCLOS] that includes the enforcement of regional
fisheries agreements in the high seas.”92 In short, cooperation among
the Arctic states, including Russia, seems more likely than conflict
on fisheries issues. The real question may be whether those states
allocate sufficient resources to the enforcement of whatever regime
is put in place.

CONCLUSION
At the risk of oversimplifying these issues, this brief article has
sought to provide a basic overview of the challenges facing the
Arctic and the ways in which an existing legal framework already
provides tools to address them. This does not mean the legal
framework is adequate in every respect. But the existence of a
sophisticated, multi-layered system of governance that extends to
most, if not all, of the issues facing the Arctic strongly suggests that
the way forward is not to sweep aside that structure in favor of
something entirely new. Maritime delimitation disputes and the
balance between coastal state control and the freedom of navigation
are quintessential law of the sea issues. Furthermore, the need, for
example, to prevent “bottom trawling” along the ocean floor or to
promote and enforce vessel safety standards is not limited to the
Arctic. And while the Arctic may require a new RFMO, other issues,
such as standards for the construction of safe vessels or limitations
on the transport of hazardous materials, are more appropriately
handled on a global level. It makes little sense to spend political
capital on a difficult and contentious project—a comprehensive
treaty for the Arctic—that would unnecessarily isolate the region
from the world’s oceans system as a whole.

92. HUEBERT & YEAGER, supra note 7, at 27.
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Even efforts to create a “specific environmental regime for the
Arctic”93 or to establish an international “polar park”94 should be
viewed with caution. However well-intentioned it may be to promote
a concept of “stewardship” for the Arctic, such approaches risk
encouraging individual states or groups of states in other parts of the
world to also declare “special regimes” that would subject other
areas of the high seas to undesirable levels of coastal state
interference.95 That risk should not preclude the discussion of
feasible and lawful approaches to protecting the Arctic marine
environment or achieving cooperative arrangements, but it should
not be ignored either.
Ultimately, rather than a potential conflict between Russia and its
fellow Arctic states, the more realistic divergence of interests in the
Arctic may lie between the circumpolar states and other interested
parties from beyond the region (for example, China, Japan, or
European Union members). Accordingly, to the extent the Arctic is
to be treated differently, another consideration must be how to
include non-Arctic states in the creation of any Arctic-specific
regime that departs from the international standards that apply
everywhere else. While this may create political headaches in the
short-term, it is the better course for purposes of conflict prevention
in the long-term. A starting point would be to grant non-Arctic states
a more significant role in the activities of the Arctic Council.96
Finally, is there a “Russian question” looming behind all of these
issues? Whether we choose to proceed by strengthening and

93. Hans Corell, Reflections on the Possibilities and Limitations of a Binding
Legal Regime for the Arctic, 37 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 321 (2007) (suggesting that
this regime could be accomplished within existing international legal structures).
94. Borgerson & Antrim, supra note 13; see also Young, supra note 2, at 81
(“[T]here is much to be said for a strategy of freezing jurisdictional claims in the
central Arctic basin in order to stress the idea of stewardship and to direct attention
toward issues . . . that call for the creation of cooperative arrangements.”).
95. Those who view the high seas regime as failing to adequately serve the
interests of the world community might prefer this outcome. See, e.g., Rayfuse,
supra note 12 (arguing that the high seas regime has proven neither comprehensive
nor effective). As a result of such failures, goes the argument, the high seas in the
Arctic require special attention. But why seek to remedy the high seas regime only
with respect to the Arctic? And why endow the Arctic states—who are not the only
states entitled to the use of Arctic waters—with that authority?
96. See Young, supra note 2, at 77, 79-80.
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extending the existing framework where we must, or to develop new
solutions, will Russia choose to participate within that system? As
noted at several points above, Russia, by and large, is already doing
so. Moreover, Russian officials have been at pains to counteract the
characterization of the Arctic described at the beginning of this
article: the faulty notion of the Arctic as a future battleground
between Russia and the West. For example, the Russian Foreign
Ministry has publicly stated that discussion of “a possible military
conflict for Arctic resources is baseless” and that the problems facing
the region will be resolved “on the basis of international law.”97 Even
the provocative figure at the head of Russia’s North Pole expedition
has sought to downplay the situation, remarking that “[n]obody’s
going to war with anybody” and that while Russia will “defend [its]
economic interests . . . a conflict in the near future” is unlikely.98
Moreover, the United States has largely acknowledged that Russia is
adhering to the applicable rule of law, in particular with respect to
the extended continental shelf.99 Simultaneously, Russia appears to
be engaged with the international community when it comes to the
Arctic: through the Arctic Council, through the IMO, and in bilateral
and multilateral efforts with its fellow Arctic states.100
At a minimum, Russia’s conduct in the Arctic appears broadly
comparable to the conduct of other states with a presence in the
region. Russia’s position on the Northern Sea Route may run afoul of
international law to the extent it continues to impose burdensome
requirements on prospective commercial shipping interests. Its
position may become difficult to square with the relevant UNCLOS
provisions and will also seem increasingly counterproductive with
respect to developing the waterway’s commercial potential. But
Russia’s position on this particular issue is generally consistent with
that of Canada, the only other similarly-situated state (and not a state
97. Moscow Asks To Stop Arctic War Intimidations, INTERFAX, Oct. 22, 2008.
98. James Kilner, Russia Plays Down Talk of Arctic Resource Conflict,
REUTERS, June 10, 2009.
99. Press Briefing, U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Russian
Claims to Arctic Territory (Taken Question) (Sept. 18, 2008) (on file with author).
100. To take just one example, the Russian Ministry of Regional Development
and the Canadian Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development have
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to examine cooperative projects
with respect to indigenous peoples in the region. See CANADA’S NORTHERN
STRATEGY, supra note 59, at 34.
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that is frequently associated with lapses in adherence to rule of law
principles). On continental shelf issues, Russia may be moving
towards collaboration on a joint submission with Canada and
Denmark. And on environmental and fisheries issues, Russia is at the
bargaining table—again, at the Arctic Council, within various
RFMOs, and elsewhere.
On all of these fronts, there will continue to be opportunities to
engage with Russia on collaborative solutions to the challenges
facing the Arctic—problems that lend themselves to multilateral
solutions. These opportunities to engage with Russia should be
seized by the United States and others. By finding common ground
in the Arctic, these efforts may have a positive byproduct: the
improvement of relations with Russia in other spheres of conflict and
areas of shared interest.

